PhD thesis
from moral sceptic to virtuous agent
an investigation into how to get one to do what is in the interest of all
Altruism and justice can help to sustain cooperation, from which all may benefit. Few will doubt this, and even a moral sceptic may agree that a society of moral agents would be a better society. This Moral Sceptic, however, sees no reason to be moral. Moral action, in his view, is against his interest, which he thinks can only secured by acting prudentially, and he may doubt whether genuine moral action exists at all.
If we were to point out to him that the existence and proliferation of moral sceptics is a serious social problem, this would not be an argument that would move him. For although he desires society to do well - for he realises that he needs society - he sees that his contribution could help society only a little, while by being a freerider, he can benefit himself a lot.
I will argue that no rational argument will convince him to be moral, for there is nothing wrong with his reasoning. It is his emotions which make him a sceptic. But he may still be changed, for the benefit of all, and his own. I will start by showing him that there is genuine moral action. Then, I will show him that there are prudential reasons for why he should desire to have his behaviour constrained by moral motivations. Finally, I will explain to him how he can become moral by training his emotions.
The sceptic will not become less free by being constrained by moral motivations. He has always been constrained by his emotions, and blinded by them to what is in his true interest. It is only when he becomes a virtuous person that they will start constraining him as they should. Instead of being a slave of his emotions, they will start working for him, enabling him to make the most of his life as a naturally social human being.